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Abstract 
This paper explores the philosophical roots of appropriation within 
Marx’s theories and socio-cultural studies in an attempt to seek 
common ground among existing theories of technology appropriation 
in IS research. Drawing on appropriation perspectives from Adaptive 
Structuration Theory, the Model of Technology Appropriation and the 
Structurational Model of Technology for comparison, we aim to 
generate a Marxian model that provides a starting point toward a 
general causal model of technology appropriation. This paper opens 
a philosophical discussion on the phenomenon of appropriation in the 
IS community, directing attention to foundational concepts in the 
human ↔ technology nexus using ideas conceived by Marx.  
Introduction 
The interplay between human behaviour and technology is a central theme in 
contemporary information systems (IS) research (Cousins and Robey, 2005; 
Beaudry and Pinsonneault, 2005; Jones and Karsten, 2008).  Its interdisciplinary 
nature, drawing from referent disciplines such as information technology studies and 
sociology, provides a rich field of research challenges. Two research areas that 
address the human ↔ technology interplay include studies of acceptance and use 
(Davis, 1989, 1993; Orlikowski, 1992, 2000) and adoption (Venkatesh et al., 2003; 
Ahuja and Thatcher, 2005; Davis and Hufnagel, 2007).  A socio-cultural concept 
linked to these research areas is the notion of ‘appropriation’. 
‘Appropriation’ has been a central concept in the Social Constructivist School of 
Information Systems, which examines the relationships between human agency, 
technology and social structures.  Early proponents of social structures as an 
influence on appropriation were DeSanctis and Poole (1994). Their Adaptive 
Structuration Theory (AST) combined the notions of appropriation and Giddens’ 
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(1979, 1984) social structures to examine the relationship between human 
behaviour and information technology. Another view of this relationship is 
Orlikowski’s (1992; 2000) Duality of Technology (later the Structurational Model of 
Technology). Though Orlikowski (1992) initially supported DeSanctis and Poole’s 
view that social structures could be embedded in technology (and were appropriated 
by users), she later refined this view into structures being emergent properties and 
appropriation as enactment of technology within social systems (Orlikowski, 2000). 
While these existing theories draw on social science principles to consider 
appropriation by groups, emerging theories such as Carroll’s (2004) Model of 
Technology Appropriation present perspectives on the interplay between an 
individual and a technology. Addressing this diversity, Overdijk and van Diggelen 
(2006) considered the socio-cultural roots and philosophical origins of appropriation. 
Even DeSanctis and Poole and Orlikowski briefly drew on the appropriation 
philosophies of Karl Marx (and ultimately Hegel) through its interpretation by Ollman 
(1971). We believe that, with the research community still searching for unity, a 
foundational approach is timely.  
Although these past studies have used social science theories, such as Giddens, to 
build frameworks for appropriation, surprisingly few have drawn on Marx. Bagozzi 
(2007) levels several criticisms at technology adoption and acceptance theories that 
have used social science bases e.g. a lack of clear theoretical underpinning, 
piecemeal understandings and a lack of predictive power. We feel that a Marxian 
perspective can help solve such problems. By adopting a Marxian stance, we 
provide a model that:   
• Is a historically-rooted grand theory with sociological resonance across a large 
body of disciplines and naturally explores the subject/object relationship; 
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• In contrast to existing theories, considers both individual and group level 
appropriation. Furthermore, it illustrates these interactions in a process-oriented 
manner that yields explanatory and predictive power; and, 
• Retains the ontological commensurability, underpinnings and constructs that are 
true to the Marxian intent, fuelling a model designed for the human-technology 
nexus without compromising the original theoretical notions.  
In this paper, we first explore Marx’s dichotomous view of human nature as natural 
being and species being. We then introduce social being as a way to integrate 
structurational concepts into Marx’s paradigm.  A discussion of Structuration Theory 
follows to explain the various structurationist influences on social being. We return to 
Marx to introduce the important concepts of perception, orientation and 
appropriation, leading into a review of the latter’s’ socio-cultural development. From 
this, we review the major theoretical works on appropriation in the information 
systems literature. Following this discussion, we derive our Marxian technology 
appropriation model.  Finally, we conclude with implications for IS research and our 
model’s relevance to existing theories of technology appropriation, use and 
disappropriation.  
Our objectives in this paper are threefold: (1) to demonstrate how the various 
conceptions of technology have common ground in Marx’s philosophy, and in doing 
so open up philosophical discussion on a fundamental concept in the human ↔ 
technology nexus, (2) to propose a general conceptualization of technology 
appropriation that encompasses varying appropriation behaviours, and (3) to 
provide a starting point towards a general causal model of technology appropriation.  
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The Dichotomy of Human Nature 
We begin by exploring Marx’s conception of human nature, specifically the 
dichotomy of natural being and species being.  Adding to this dichotomy is the 
notion of social being, which situates humans within their social context.  A critical 
conception in Marx’s philosophy is that of dialectics.  This suggests that the way to 
view the world is as an evolving process rather than a collection of things (Sowell, 
1985).  Marx sees the basic unit of reality as relations - fact-value, cause-effect or 
nature-society, or, in our case, human-IS.  He emphasizes the idea of development 
or the “transition from one form to another” (Marx, 1959, p.44), an idea that 
resonates in his views on the subject-object relation(ship) and the transformation of 
work into products during the process of labour.  
Describing labour, Marx states that it is “a process in which both man and nature 
participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates and controls the 
material reactions between himself and nature…by thus acting on the external world 
and changing it, he at the same time changes his own nature” (McLellan, 1980, 
p.164).  The dialectic approach harbours the distinction between inner, inherent 
forces within humans and the outward, external appearance of objects.  Humans 
themselves can be an object, but only in interaction with other humans.  The 
development or transition that occurs between inner forces and external appearance 
is the freeing of the inner senses, or the unravelling or unfolding of human essence, 
which allows us to realize our essential powers (Ollman, 1971). 
Human beings possess powers and needs: natural needs (e.g. procreation) and 
powers (e.g. senses) are shared with all living entities, while species needs and 
powers are possessed by humans alone (e.g. creative expression).  Ollman (1971) 
makes clearer the distinction between needs and powers, with needs being the 
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desire one feels toward an object that is not always immediately available, and 
powers equating to the faculty, ability, function and capacity that enable an 
individual’s fulfilment with the object and the object’s future forms or potential.  All of 
these needs and powers comprise the essential powers of humans and represent 
Marx’s dichotomy of natural being and species being. 
Natural Being – Species Being – Social Being 
Natural being can be equated to animal functions or physical needs.  Ollman (1977, 
p.77-78) identifies two outstanding characteristics of natural being: (1) natural 
powers exist in humans as tendencies, abilities or impulses; and (2) natural powers 
seek fulfilment in objects outside of the body.  At the level of natural being, humans 
are suffering and limited, albeit objective and sensuous, unable to distinguish 
themselves from their acts through imagination, are without ability or self-
awareness, and are spontaneously controlled by the availability and qualities of 
objects in nature (Marx, 1977).  Natural being is guided by senses and basic 
functions, with behaviour driven by unconscious use of senses. It is through 
relations with objects that humans define their higher powers and needs. 
When Marx speaks of objects, he does not specifically refer to material things.  For 
Marx, objects are ‘the object of a subject’, that is, ethereal.  Natural powers manifest 
in and through objects, and in turn humans require objects to express their powers.  
Realization is the fulfilment of powers and the objectification of these powers in 
nature.  Through realization, humans are established by objects and objects in turn 
“reside in the very nature of [our] being” (Marx, 1977, p.156).  Thus, objects can be 
understood as either material or ethereal.  In the case of the latter, the virtual 
existence of objects likens to the idea of structures (see Giddens, 1979). Structures 
can only be wholly realized through the perspective of social being.  
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Because humans create a world of objects through activity, we prove ourselves as 
conscious species being (Marx, 1977).  The conscious life activity of species being 
is separate from the animal life activity of natural being.  Where the animal does not 
distinguish itself from its life activity, humans are self-conscious, self-aware and able 
to confirm themselves through knowing. Two characteristics of species being are: 
(1) the peculiar physicality that establishes us as human; and (2) the way we 
manifest ourselves as a species through activity of quality and pace that is unique to 
human beings (Ollman, 1971, p. 82).  
Species powers are driven by the same ‘physical’ senses that drive natural powers 
but have the added ‘mental senses’ unique to humans.  Although we have explored 
the difference between natural and species being, the two are not necessarily 
opposing contrasts in the dialectic of human nature. Since humans also possess 
animal functions (i.e. sight, touch, smell), natural being is subsumed within species 
being.  Natural being is driven by instinctive behaviour, while species being employs 
senses and functions in a reflexive human fashion as part of species life activity.  
Species life activity places the individual (natural being and species being) within the 
social system as social being (Marx, 1977).  
Through social relations, humans confirm and establish their existence as species 
being (Marx and Engels, 1942). Marx conceives of society as the cooperation of 
individuals: relations in society can be external as the product of reciprocal activities, 
and sometimes society exists within an individual through social relations.  
Importantly, humans do not only relate to each other through contact, but can relate 
to one another through their objects (Ollman, 1971). 
Beyond the dichotomy of natural and species being, a social being has social needs 
that reflect the powers of other humans. These powers have developed – through 
similar experience – to the analogous wants, demands and utility of society (Ollman, 
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1971).  Giddens (1979) holds a similar view of social systems, being emergent by 
nature, and shaped by the mutual recursiveness of structure and agency.  Social 
beings are the product of their context, while at the same time contribute to their 
environment through interactions. Figure 1 summarizes the hierarchical but 
integrated nature of natural, species and social being: 
 
Figure 1. Conception of Human Nature 
 
Species being is the individual conscious actor, subsuming the powers and needs of 
natural being, and acting as social being in relation to others in society.  To further 
consider social being and its relationship with species and natural being, we now 
briefly describe Gidden’s Structuration Theory. 
Social Structures – Giddens’ Structuration Theory 
Structuration Theory (ST) explores the mutuality between virtual, ethereal structures 
that comprise social systems and the human agency that creates them.  As a 
framework of unification, ST sought to bridge the divide between determinism (those 
who consider social phenomena as objective social structures) and voluntarism 
(those who see social phenomena as products of human agents subjectively 
interpreting the world) that had existed in sociology prior to its construction (Timbrell 
et al., 2005).  Giddens saw social systems as comprised of day-to-day social 
interactions involving ‘situated activities’ of human agents existing in time-space, 
and are constituted by regular, reproduced relations of ‘interdependence’ between 
Social Being 
Species Being 
Natural Being 
Consciousness, Individual
Referent social.
Instinct, Senses.
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either individual agents or a collective group.  These are also ‘recurrent social 
practices’, or the mutual dependence of structure and agency.  
In ST, structure refers to virtual ‘patterns’ of social relationships and exist only as 
structural properties. These structural properties are rules and resources that, in 
social reproduction, bind time and result in enduring practices in social systems 
(reproduced relations between actors or groups, organized as regular social 
practices that occur in time and space). To regard structure as a ‘virtual order’ 
implies recognizing the existence of: (a) knowledge –as memory traces – of how 
things are to be done (said, written) on the part of social actors; (b) social practices 
organized through the recursive mobilization of that knowledge; (c) capabilities that 
the production of those social practices presupposes (Giddens, 1979, p.64). 
Structural properties of social systems then are both “the medium and outcome of 
practices constituting those systems” (Giddens 1979, p. 69) and institutions are a 
product of human agency but are an “outcome of action only in so far as they are 
also involved recursively as the medium of its production” (op. cit. p. 95).  
Structuration refers to ‘the dynamic process whereby structures come into being’ 
(King, 2004, p.121) and structures only manifest from social interaction.   
Structures (Giddens, 1979) are understood as systems of semantic rules (structures 
of signification), as systems of resources (structures of domination) and as systems 
of moral rules (structures of legitimation).  These three modes of structure are in turn 
related to three moments of interaction, summarizing the relationships as 
signification-communication, domination-power and legitimation-sanction.  Across 
communication of meaning, operation of power relations and the enactment of 
normative sanctions, actors draw upon what Giddens refers to as modalities in the 
production of social interaction.  These modalities are interpretative schemes used 
in the communication of meaning, facilities used in the exercise of power relations, 
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and norms applied to the sanction of social behaviour. The modalities are not only 
the factors of social production but also its media and output.   
Although Marx does not directly address the notion of structures, the idea of human 
actors as comprising of and shaped by these structures resonates within his work.  
Marx (1977) considers social being, for instance, as an actor whose cognitive 
behaviours are both shaped by instinct and consciousness and guided by external 
social influences. These referent social frameworks influence the perception, 
orientation and appropriation of an object (or artefact) by an individual.  We now 
discuss these three Marxian processes.     
MARX: PERCEPTION – ORIENTATION - APPROPRIATION 
To piece together the fragments of Marx’s theoretical lattice, we begin with natural 
and species powers.  There are three interconnected processes that establish the 
link between the essential powers of humans and the world around them: 
perception, orientation and appropriation (Ollman, 1971; Marx, 1977).  Defining the 
first two concepts (Ollman, 1971, p. 85): 
• Perception is the immediate contact a human (natural being) has with nature 
through the instinctive senses; and 
• Orientation is the way that humans (species being) relate to things by 
establishing patterns, places and worth, and [cognitively] construct the 
framework for subsequent actions within the social world. 
Thus, perception is the exercise of natural being powers while orientation is the 
exercise of powers by species being.  Humans exercise perception and orientation 
in an integrated fashion, just as they employ structures in an integrated way.  Marx 
also discusses the concept of realization: an object is realized as ‘fulfilling of the 
natural senses’ or an object is realized as ‘attributive or enhancing of the species 
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powers’.  In the act of realization, humans see an object as an ‘instance of 
themselves’, residing within their natural or species being (Marx, 1977).   
In Marx’s philosophy, the two concepts of perception and orientation link together 
irrevocably.  Perception leads immediately to orientation, with the latter establishing 
meaning, structure and future goals for perception. However, orientation can be 
present before perception since humans choose objects that are realized or deemed 
irrelevant before perceiving it directly (e.g. based on a colleague’s description).  
Both of these concepts carry the act of appropriation.  The most general definition of 
appropriation is “to utilize constructively; to build by incorporating: the subject is 
man’s essential powers” (Ollman, 1971, p. 89).  In Marx’s view, appropriation is the 
way humans relate to nature. Perception is appropriation through the exercise of the 
natural needs and powers of the individual, while orientation is the individual 
realizing the consciously held potential an artefact harbours. 
We note at this point that Marx applied his concept of appropriation to his work on 
alienation.  For Marx, labour is seen as external to the worker and not belonging to 
his intrinsic nature.  The product of the worker’s labour is an object. It is the 
objectification or realization of labour to which humans become alienated or 
estranged (Marx, 1977).  It is not the intention of this paper to pursue the notion of 
appropriation into such mainstream and previously well-covered political 
discussions, but rather focus on its applicability to the field of IS.   
In this paper we see appropriation as humans realizing essential powers as fulfilled 
by objects in nature, and in the context of this research, the objects of interest are 
technology.  Pomeroy (2004) notes that the fundamental condition for all human 
activity is the existence of an objective world.  The activity of a subject cannot 
operate in isolation from the objective world, and all perception requires both the 
senses and the object sensed.  Pomeroy (2004) refers to Marx (1959, p.106) who 
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describes this subject-object relationship as being “each human relation to the 
world…seeing, hearing, smelling, feeling, thinking, [awareness], sensing, writing – in 
short, all the organs of the individual being, like those organs which are directly 
social in their form, are in their objective orientation or in their orientation to the 
object, the appropriation of that object, the appropriation of the human world.” 
Technology is a collective of objects in which a human, either as natural or species 
being, can realize his or her needs for the expression of essential powers.  Ollman 
(1971, p. 137) states: “Appropriation is Marx’s most general expression for man 
incorporating the nature he comes into contact with into himself.  Activity enters this 
account as the chief means by which man appropriates objects... [Objects] become 
the most effective medium between the individual and the outer world.” 
Marx gives three moments of activity relating to human powers: (1) activity is the 
foremost example of the combined operation of humans’ powers and needs (or 
essential powers); (2) activity establishes new possibilities for fulfilment of needs 
and powers by transforming nature and nature-imposed limitations; and (3) activity 
is the means by which the potential of powers are developed.  
Ollman (1971) states that appropriation occupies the most prominent space in 
Marx’s works, and in his later writings, perception and orientation are “wholly 
subsumed under it” (p.86).  Appropriation is the relation between human senses and 
nature, but appropriation can be a changing state, with the potential to affect future 
perception and orientation through the effect it has on humans and objects.  This 
changing state recognizes the complex, emergent nature of human relations within 
the complex environments in which these human relations operate, or, as we 
conceive it, a complex world.  In contrast, technology, and information technology in 
particular, is a much more linear world in nature.  The interaction between the 
complex and emergent world of human agency and the linear world of technology 
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such as information systems is mediated by both individual and group behaviour 
and beliefs.  This is consistent with other usage theories such as the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (see Fishbein and Azjen, 1975).   
The notion of appropriation has been further developed and discussed in socio-
cultural learning and information systems literature.  In the next section we briefly 
review this literature before describing our Marxian model in detail. 
Appropriation 
A key motivation of socio-cultural studies is the relationship between human mental 
processes and the cultural, historical and institutional settings within which they are 
situated (Wertsch, 1995). In the socio-cultural field, appropriation refers to cultural 
learning, or the appropriation of cultural tools (Overdijk and van Diggelen, 2006).  
Wertsch (1998) describes appropriation as the act of taking something that belongs 
to another and making it one’s own, a notion that stems from Bakthin’s (1981) 
process of one speaker adopting a word from another system of language and 
assigning it their own semantic meaning or expression. Appropriation of cultural 
tools or resources, such as systems of communication, occurs through cultural 
activities where the tool plays a role among the individuals (Newman et al., 1989).  
In her study of personal, interpersonal and community development, Rogoff (1995) 
identifies three uses of the term appropriation: (1) Internalization (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966), whereby something external is imported; (2) A process preceding 
transformation (Harre, 1983), where what is imported is also transformed to fit the 
purposes of the new owner and (3) Rogoff’s own conception of participatory 
appropriation. The final use refers to the way in which people, by participating in an 
activity, adopt and change its meaning through ongoing communication, and in turn 
change themselves and are prepared to engage in subsequent similar activities. Her 
 Sprouts 2008 http://sprouts.aisnet.org/8-28
 13
view deviates from Harre’s (1983) concept of appropriation as a precondition for 
transformation, instead calling appropriation a “process of becoming rather than 
acquisition” (Rogoff, 1995, p. 142), and that change is a result of activity and not 
internalization of an external instantiation. This accords with the view of information 
systems potential and use (Bia and Kalika, 2005). 
Rogoff’s (1995) conceptualization of appropriation as a process of transformation 
also resonates with Marx’s view.  Realization is not only the perception of an object 
by a human, but also the orientation toward it - the fulfilment and ratification of 
essential powers by use. The object undergoes transformation from something 
external to something ‘naturalized’ to the inherent senses of the natural being and 
‘embedded’ within the cognitive processes of the species being.  
MacKay and Gillespie (1992) posit that appropriation of technology is a subjective 
and social activity, stating that “people are not merely malleable subjects who 
submit to the dictates of a technology…they are active, creative and expressive – 
albeit socially situated – subjects” (p. 698).  They allude to the way in which people 
are not conceptualized entities that predicatively lend themselves to rigid theories, 
but are social beings part of a cultured, institutional setting wherein ‘complex’ 
interactions take place.  Consequently, appropriation is not always a linear process, 
since “people may reject technologies, redefine their functional purpose, customize 
or even invest symbolic meanings to them” (p.699). McKay and Gillespie 
subsequently view technology as interpretive and flexible, which we will later see is 
consistent across the IS frameworks. This view however does not specifically relate 
to the features of a technology, but the structures a technology brings or alters as 
individuals engage with it. A technology designed rigidly for a specific purpose or 
task may be seen as inflexible, however, this may be because the structural 
properties of the technology – as Marx might say - have already been realized.   
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In socio-cultural literature, appropriation of technology has two outcomes consistent 
with a Marxian view. Firstly, a technology is perceived and oriented to by species 
being (i.e. institutional member) as a cultural tool – when it matches inherent senses 
and cognitive processes and is realized in the fulfilment of needs and powers, it is 
appropriated. Secondly, a technology becomes appropriated through the process of 
transformation by social being utilizing it within their dynamic ‘world’ (i.e. institution).  
The fundamental notions of socio-cultural appropriation by Bakthin (1981), Wertsch 
(1998) and Rogoff (1995) hold across the IS frameworks, yet their applicability in the 
IS field has not been fully explored. Theories embracing appropriation have also 
tended to employ the work of Giddens (1979) as a framework for considering group 
motives that influence technology. We now look at three of these IS theories: 
Adaptive Structuration Theory (Poole and DeSanctis, 1989, 1990, 1992; DeSanctis 
and Poole, 1994), the Structurational Model of Technology (Orlikowski and Robey, 
1991; Orlikowski, 1992, 2000), and the Model of Technology Appropriation (Carroll 
et al., 2002, 2003; Carroll, 2004).  
Adaptive Structuration Theory 
As a techno-centric extension of Structuration, Adaptive Structuration Theory (AST), 
has proved a popular lens in IS studies across the last decade (e.g. Gopal et al., 
1992; Chin et al, 1997; Salisbury et al., 2002). The context of its development was 
Group Decision Support Systems (GDSS), leading to a theoretical lens that 
examines the organizational effects of technology appropriation.   
Initially, Poole and DeSanctis (1990, p.150) defined appropriation as the process of 
“how users alter systems, thereby enacting socio-technical change within the 
group”.  Later, DeSanctis and Poole (1994, p. 128) called “the immediate, visible 
actions that evidence deeper structuration processes, appropriations of the 
technology” and cited Ollman’s (1971) work as a source in this definition.   
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When users appropriate a technology, they also appropriate the ‘structures’ 
embedded within the technological artefact. AST proposes four modes of 
appropriation: (1) appropriation moves, otherwise known as consensus on 
appropriation; (2) faithfulness of appropriation, being the way an Advanced 
Information Technology (AIT) is used with respect to its original intent; (3) 
instrumental uses that incorporate what features are used by the group to 
understand why the AIT has been employed; and (4) attitudes toward appropriation, 
representing the beliefs and views work group members have toward an AIT. 
In contrast to AST, Orlikowski’s model moved away from the idea of appropriation of 
technology structures to a complementary notion of enactment - appropriation, in 
her view is a purely social process. 
Structurational Model of Technology 
Using Giddens’ (1979, 1984) concepts of recursiveness, mediation and duality of 
structure, Orlikowski and Robey (1991) developed the Structurational Model of 
Technology.  This framework attributes a recursive notion to technology, or a duality 
of technology (Orlikowski, 1992), where technology is regarded as a product of 
human action and a consequence of human interaction. In this model, she proposes 
the following (Orlikowski, 1992, p.410): (a) technology is a product of human action, 
such as design, development, appropriation and modification; (b) technology is a 
medium of human action, facilitating and constraining it through provision of 
interpretive schemes, facilities and norms; (c) institutional conditions of interaction 
with technology influence humans in their interaction with it; and (d) institutional 
consequences of this interaction influence institutional properties of an organization 
by reinforcing or transforming structures of signification, domination and legitimation.  
Her duality of technology view consists of technology physically built by designers 
and the product of a particular temporal and organizational context. This idea is 
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enhanced by the notion of interpretive flexibility (Orlikowski, 1992), which considers 
two modes of interaction in technology: the design mode and the use mode.  In the 
former, designers impart certain interpretive schemes, facilities and norms into 
technology, while in the latter, agents appropriate technology through assigned 
meaning and are influenced by it through execution.  She emphasizes however that 
any constraining structures are institutional and not within the technology itself.  
Another proponent of technology-in-use as a building block of appropriation in the 
human ↔ IS nexus is Carroll et al. (2002, 2003). 
Model of Technology Appropriation 
The Model of Technology Appropriation (MTA) as proposed by Carroll et al. (2002, 
2003) depicts the appropriation process as the transformation of a Technology-as-
Designed into a Technology-in-Use.  A technology-as-designed embodies the views 
of designers and marketers and the requirements of users, and a technology-in-use 
captures the needs of users as they are expressed through the action undertaken as 
the technology is utilized in everyday activities.  
The MTA was originally developed in the context of single-user appropriations - 
unlike AST that predominantly examines group appropriations.  The MTA sought to 
capture the process or act of appropriation from filtering of initial attractors, to the 
establishment of evaluative criteria and the subsequent reinforcement of these 
criteria through use (Carroll et al., 2003).  Carroll (2004) later extends the model to 
represent a Technology Appropriation Cycle, purporting that developers first 
construct the technology and users close the cycle in their use of it.  
MTA suggests that appropriation involves a systematic evaluation by users as they 
progress through three levels: encountering the technology (Level 1), adopting and 
adapting it (Level 2) and then ‘stabilizing’ it by integrating it into routines and 
practices (Level 3). Level 1 is when initial judgments occur. Here, the user first 
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encounters a technology as designed and makes an initial evaluation based on its 
innovation and expectations of its value (Carroll, 2004). The user enters a filtering 
process, recognizing certain attractors that will encourage appropriation. 
Conversely, a lack of attractors will result in non-appropriation.  During Level 2, 
users begin to fashion criteria through continued evaluation of the technology - they 
explore, adopt and adapt to it. In this process, the technology will afford some 
activities or constrain others, and in turn, users may configure or personalize 
technology to either find innovative new uses.  
Level 3 is what Carroll (2004) calls appropriation. Users persist with the technology 
over time, developing reinforcers that fortify the technology as part of their activities 
and practice. The technology becomes ‘stabilized’ during this period; alternatively, 
changes in the reinforcers may lead to re-evaluation of the technology and possibly 
disappropriation. In extending the MTA as a technology appropriation cycle, Carroll 
(2004) suggests that a technology as designed reaches its final stage of 
transformation through the appropriation of it by users. 
The Appropriation Dilemma 
With our review of these IS frameworks, we feel that there are three issues that 
affect the understanding of appropriation within the field: 
• While the existing literature generally recognizes the interplay and interaction 
between human and technology, the process that leads to how the interaction 
might play out is neither well understood nor incorporated into these theories. 
Carroll (2004) has made an attempt in this direction but her description still 
focuses on the behavioural outcome rather than the integral processes that lead 
to those outcomes. In order to fully understand and account for technology 
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appropriation, we propose a model that takes into consideration the processes 
that lead to appropriation. 
• While literature appears to rely on various elements from the social sciences, 
e.g. the ideas of structures, subject-object distinction, appropriation, object-as-
artefact vs object-in-use, etc., all of which, as we pointed out, could be traced 
back to the Marxian root, they have not been considered in a holistic manner. 
We believe that by using ideas piecemeal, emphasizing one component while 
neglecting the others could result in a piecemeal understanding of technology 
appropriation.1 
• Relating to the above issue, the transition of the state of relationships between 
an individual and technology, from perception to orientation, realization to 
appropriation, and then to disappropriation, is not well understood. We argue 
that a clear understanding of this transition is critical to the development of a 
theory for not only appropriation but also adoption and rejection of technology. 
On the final point, the existing models consider appropriation at the point of a 
technology being introduced into a system. Carroll’s model does attempt an 
understanding of drivers or behaviours that begin an appropriation, but the 
discussion still remains unclear.  A Marxian approach can correct these dilemmas. 
By considering the entire process of appropriation, including pre-adoptive factors 
such as motivation (perception), behaviors throughout the process (orientation) and 
the subsequent socialization of a technology as it is subsumed into group activities 
(appropriation), we can potentially assess non-appropriation, unintended use and 
disappropriation and provide a predictive, explanatory depiction of the process.  
                                                 
1 We recognize that the authors may have started with a different ontological base, rather 
than the Marxian paradigm, and thus this comment may not be entirely fair. We argue that in 
as much as these concepts have their roots in Marxian paradigm, such comparison is both 
reasonable and constructive. 
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We now present our integrated three-tier model of appropriation constructed from 
Marx’s conceptual building blocks. 
THREE-TIER MODEL OF TECHNOLOGY APPROPRIATION 
Our technology appropriation model is derived from the literature, building upon the 
concepts of Marx (1977) as reiterated by Ollman (1971).  The major integrated 
concepts are natural being, species being, social being, perception, orientation and 
realization (Marx, 1977; Ollman, 1971); appropriation (Marx, 1977; Ollman, 1971; 
Rogoff, 1995); technology as artefact (Orlikowski, 2000) and technology in use 
(Caroll et al., 2002, 2003; Orlikowski, 2000). 
The model defines three levels of interaction with technology: the intrinsic behaviour 
and senses of natural being, the consciousness of species being and the 
structurational modalities of social being.  The model is presented below in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Technology appropriation model 
 
In essence, the model applies the Marxian process of appropriation to the 
information systems context. However, we feel that the perspective of this model is 
not bounded by this context and, in contrast to AST, SMT and the MTA, is not 
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limited to a specific instance of technology. Because the Marxian approach sits 
within a wider framework of sociology, it affords an understanding of actions and 
motivations that are not restricted to a specific feature or intended use.   
Further, existing appropriation theories separate units of analysis within 
appropriation into individuals or groups. Marx’s dialectic approach covers both 
individual and group behaviors. Moreover, it attempts to understand these actions 
from the very point when a technology comes into play, including what drivers incite 
appropriation, the manifesting actions from the individual and group members as the 
technology is appropriated, and post-adoption effects on both the social system and 
the technology. With this dichotomy of individual and social patterns of behavior 
over the course of appropriation, we are able to account for culture, personal action 
and occupational influences. We now describe this model from the inside out.   
Natural Being: Perception of Technology 
Natural being perceives a technology in its artefact state; that is, technology in its 
static form without prior observations or established patterns of use for that 
technology.  An individual encounters this artefact through physical senses - sight, 
hearing and touch, through which the tangible immediacy of the object, its function 
and form, is considered.  Judgments are formed of the essential needs or powers 
that this artefact will fulfil purely through instinct.  In perception, natural being 
intuitively forecasts the sensory enablement a technology-as-artefact might offer. 
It is through perception that our senses find essentiality (see Marx, 1977) in the 
technology.  Natural being intuits that when the technology is placed into use, it will 
provide an enhancement of senses that enables essential powers or fulfils essential 
needs.  This instinctual recognition occurs either prior to or simultaneously with the 
conscious orientation to the technological artefact by species being.  
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Species Being and Social Being: Orientation of Technology 
Where natural being employs intrinsic senses to seek physical fulfilment of essential 
powers and needs in a technology, species being employs the unique human 
characteristics and the faculty, ability, function and capacity of conscious behaviour 
to assess the species powers and needs (see also Maslow (1943) for a discussion 
of human needs).  During orientation, species being projects future behaviour, 
envisioning the subject-object relationship between the user and the artefact.  
Species being forecasts the transformation of work arising from the human ↔ 
technology interplay into products and services during the labour process.  Species 
being may orient to a technology in a presumptive or pre-supposed manner (a 
socially ‘intended’ use) or engage unique creativity and expressiveness to exploit 
uses of a technology-as-artefact in an innovative manner.  Orientation is thus the 
future imagined use of the artefact by species being. 
In the orientation process, species being relates to technology through cognition.  
This subject-object relationship manifests through experientially developed or 
consciously held routines, guidelines and behaviours driven by occupational or 
cultural practice. Additional frameworks or meanings held in abstract social 
structures may be employed in the individual’s connection with the technology-as-
artefact.  One may socially associate intended use patterns with an artefact or an 
individual may assign new meanings or uses to the artefact.  Orientation towards a 
specific technology, therefore, may be guided by individual choice (voluntarism) or 
socially-based structurationist modalities (determinism). The notion of use-as-
intended vs. innovative use is merely an outcome of orientation by species being. 
We reaffirm at this point that perception and orientation occur simultaneously or 
iteratively, depending on the context.  Both are at the individual level and combine 
as realization (Ollman, 1971). The technology-as-artefact is realized through the 
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natural and species needs and powers, respectively fulfilled through the sensory 
enablement or enhancement of cognition arising from the technology-in-use.  
Realization 
It is at the point of realization when the technology-as-artefact becomes technology-
in-use that the desired needs and powers of the individual begin to manifest through 
preliminary engagement with the technology.  This is the beginning of the 
appropriation process.  Realization is the active fulfilment of natural (intuitive) and 
species (imagined) needs and powers, which are confirmed through use.  For the 
purposes of this discussion let us assume that the human ↔ technology interaction 
has some positive outcome and is not immediately disappropriated.  
The effects of the adoption and application of the artefact can be seen firstly at the 
level of species being.  As the individual discovers that the technology presents an 
enhancement of the senses and/or an enhancement of cognition, the technology 
might begin fulfilling needs and powers not previously anticipated.  As the individual 
(subject) realizes the technology (object), the individual also realizes themself 
through the technology-in-use. This process of reflexivity yields the patterns of 
behaviours and meanings that a person ascribes to the technology.  The use 
patterns as recognized by species being are reiterated by social being.  These uses 
of the technology proliferate throughout the organizational system to result in social 
activity that both shapes and is shaped by technology-in-use (Giddens, 1979; 
Orlikowski, 2000).  
If one individual verbally describes a potential technology and draws on referent 
frameworks or behaviours in their description, another user is able to orient to a 
technology without necessarily perceiving it.  
In light of these discussions, we posit three propositions:  
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P1: Regardless of the intended use of a technology (be it for individual or group 
purposes), one could influence the orientation of an individual towards the 
technology either by directly appealing to the senses of the individual (natural being) 
or indirectly through the social being (or both). 
P2: An individual will orient positively towards a technology if the technology is 
presented to be able to enhance the individual’s senses or cognition (or both). 
P3: While an individual’s orientation towards a technology could be influenced 
socially, the ultimate realization of a technology, however, is dependent on the 
individual being able to perceive it directly. 
What this leads to is the conception that species being, while retaining unique 
creativity and expressiveness of self, also patterns behaviours off their social 
environment.  Species being performs the specific sets of behaviours that result in 
technology-in-use not only enhancing his or her own senses and cognition, but also 
contributes to the ethereal structures of their social system (Giddens, 1979).  
Ongoing behaviours, either predetermined or new, are socially constructed and 
recursively executed.  
Appropriation 
Full appropriation yields the notion that a technology-as-artefact is taken possession 
of by an individual, for that individual’s ownership and use (Marx, 1977).  Social 
being is the principal subject in the appropriation process post-realization.  
Appropriation connects humans at the level of species being to the technology by a 
process of objectification, or as Marx (1977, p. 102) states: “it is only when the 
objective world becomes everywhere for man in society the world of man’s essential 
powers…that all objects become for him the objectification of himself, become 
objects which confirm and realize his individuality, become his objects: that is, man 
himself becomes the object.” 
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From this, we can consider the interplay of human ↔ technology-as-realised as an 
essential feature of the appropriation process.  Using the Marxian approach, the 
technology user themself become an object. The user is oriented and perceives the 
technology and realizes it, allowing it to be appropriated by higher level ethereal 
concepts such as an organization.  The organization is an ethereal object that may 
seek fulfilment of essential needs and powers through the appropriation of 
technology-in-use and the user. 
At the core of appropriation is the concept that a technology whether as artefact or 
in-use, does not itself embody a structure or behaviour but represents guides to 
certain actions that manifest through use and engagement. Additionally, 
engagement with the technology might stimulate previously unrealized new needs 
and powers.  The process of re-orientation is when new uses for the technology are 
found by a social group as a result of social structures being changed or reshaped 
or individuals in the group changing or being replaced.  
This reflects Ollman’s (1971) idea of social needs being drawn from other humans 
who have developed essential powers through similar experience - technology-in-
use behaviours therefore can mimic prior human experiences as they are actively 
defined by them.  These technology-in-use behaviours draw on the structurational 
triumvirate of legitimation, domination and signification (Giddens, 1979).  
This mechanism is consistent with Orlikowski’s (2000) view that technology does not 
embody structures but structures are instead embodied in ancillary social activities.  
This is also consistent with Rogoff’s (1995) participatory appropriation whereby 
users engage in activities that are similar to ones they have previously experienced.  
Thus, technology-in-use is guided by behaviours external to the artefact and, from 
time-to-time, species being may orient differently to a technology artefact, producing 
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alternative technology-in-use behaviours to those that were socially intended.  
DeSanctis and Poole (1994) refer to these phenomena as appropriation moves.   
This leads us to different social groups appropriating technologies differently.  
Differentiations may be a result of different orientations – that is, behaviours and 
intended uses for one group may not be the same as those for another.  These 
differing behaviours might result from an individual within the group finding an 
unintended realization of essential powers.  Different cultural or occupational groups 
possessing certain expectations for behaviour will appropriate technology-in-use in 
different ways.  These differences support the notion of social being, with the 
individual drawing on referent frameworks for behaviour or the structures of their 
social setting to create meanings for a technology-in-use according with the rules of 
the group.  A resultant use of the technology that is radically different or beyond the 
bounds of the system rules may occur when several individuals begin to invent new 
technology applications.  These new appropriations can change the behaviours of 
the social group, a process Giddens (1979) describes as recursiveness.  
Behaviours within cultural or occupational groupings, driven by structurational 
modalities (interpretive schemes, rules and resources and norms) drive perception 
and orientation (realization) in natural and species being, and maintain the 
appropriation process in social being. This leads us to our fourth proposition: 
P4: It is easier to perceive and orient towards a technology-in-use already previously 
realized and socially appropriated than one that has not been realized and socially 
appropriated (even though it might better enhance senses and cognitions). 
As shown in our model, social being appropriates a technology-in-use, meaning that 
appropriation is a constant re-orientation and re-perception and therefore, an 
ongoing realization of the technology-in-use. Social being appropriates in 
accordance with how others within their cultural or occupational group are using the 
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technology.  As long as a technology fulfils the senses of natural being and enables 
the cognition of species being, the process of appropriation is ongoing, subject to 
continued social appeasement and existing structures. As a result, when a new 
technology is to be adopted, it is at the initial point of realization, perception and 
orientation that individuals draw on the established expectations and patterns of use 
that they have embedded within their active species consciousness. 
Implications for IS research 
Our model has the following implications for research: 
Technology adoption 
The most comprehensive model of technology adoption is arguably the seminal 
work by Venkatesh, Morris, Davis, and Davis (2003). They proposed a unified model 
of technology adoption and use, positing the following main constructs, which are 
collected from extant technology adoption models: performance expectancy, effort 
expectancy, social influence, and facilitating conditions, intention to use and actual 
use. A closer examination of correspondence between the constructs in their model 
and the various key conceptions in our model (although their basis for deriving these 
construct differ from ours) is beyond the scope of this paper but it is worthwhile 
considering, albeit briefly, where are the points of similarly and departure between 
their model and ours. For example, the constructs of performance expectancy and 
effort expectancy in their model mimics the notion of how an individual perceives 
whether the object would enhance his/her senses or cognition, while the social 
influence construct captures the element of social structures and associated 
facilitating conditions. These constructs are posited as influencing the intention of 
use but their influences are moderated by several demographic factors such as age, 
gender, experience, and voluntariness of use. The intention of use, together with 
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facilitating conditions, is hypothesized as affecting directly the use behaviour 
(defined as usage in their model). Again, the relationship between the constructs 
and the intention of use could be explained by the process of orientation in our 
model. However, unlike Venkatesh et. al. (2003), our model suggests that positive 
orientation would only first result in realization of the technology, i.e. the trying out of 
the technology, rather than the actual usage (in its steady state). Our model 
suggests there is still a gap between realization and appropriation, which we 
propose must be accounted for in a causal model of technology adoption in order to 
fully explain whether a new technology will ultimately be adopted.  
In addition, Bagozzi (2007) sees several flaws in contemporary technology adoption 
and acceptance models. These include the absence of a sound theory or method for 
determinants; neglect of group, social and cultural influences on decision to adopt; 
over-simplified notions of individual effect or emotion; and over-dependence on 
purely deterministic notions that exclude self-regulation. Regarding the latter point, 
most adoption models, which have their roots in TAM (Davis, 1989), do not assume 
that a technology can be subject to incentives or mandatory use within 
organizations. The Marxian approach makes no such assumptions, accounting for 
both deterministic and voluntary notions of appropriation, beyond superficial 
descriptions. Furthermore, it delivers a theoretical base that considers a range of 
individual and group level cultural, behavioral and motivational factors that drive the 
successful appropriation process, whether it is mandatory or not.   
Technology appropriation 
While Adaptive Structuration Theory is the only theory that attempts to directly 
develop the construct of appropriation, this construct is developed in the context of a 
group support system and thus assumes as its underlying concept and measures 
such notion as group consensus. As our model suggests, appropriation could occur 
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at both the individual and group or organization level. A more general construct of 
individualistic appropriation that accounts for the species and natural being as well 
as the social influence is essential for further research in technology appropriation. 
In contrast to contemporary theories such as AST (DeSanctis & Poole, 1994), our 
model does not draw largely from Giddens’ (1979) structuration theory. As a result, 
we free ourselves from two concerns: (i) the difficulty in defining objects and 
structures; and (ii) Giddens’ own ontological problems with technology being 
equated with rules and resources (Orlikowski, 2000). On the second issue, Giddens 
has expressed concerns about information systems or technology in general being 
placed as the central point of examination within his framework (Jones, 1997). 
Because the Marxian philosophy naturally deals with the subject vs. object 
relationship, this phenomenon is not an incidental analysis.  
Following the previous point, with this clear divisibility between structures and 
objects, a Marxian approach is naturally suited to the human-technology nexus. This 
resolves the issues of theory conjecture in the structure vs. object debate, and the 
issue of combining two ontological bases (i.e. appropriation and structuration 
theory). With this model, we retain a pure Marxian intent, merely refining his 
framework rather than retro-fitting it. 
Technology use and disappropriation 
The ultimate purpose of technology adoption and appropriation research is to shed 
light into how technology could be designed so that it will be accepted quickly and 
used to effectively enhance individual and organisational performance. It is critical 
therefore that we understand not only the initial adoption behaviour but also the 
continued use and very importantly, the non-appropriation or disappropriation of 
technology. 
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Our model (see proposition P1-P4) suggests that technology that fails to appeal 
directly to the senses or be perceived directly as enhancing cognition, for example, 
is unlikely to be appropriated. Similarly, a competing technology or changing 
circumstances could result in a negative orientation towards an existing technology 
and ultimately its disappropriation. Our model thus suggests that non-appropriation 
or disappropriation of technology can be mitigated through (i) ensuring that there is 
continuity with existing technology use, (ii) highlighting the appropriate signal to the 
natural being through ensuring that enhancements to senses and cognitions are 
easily perceived, and (iii) incremental buying-in starting with small social groups.  
Coupled with the transformative process, our model thus allows us to go beyond 
current theoretical models of appropriation and feasibly understand and account for 
inter-dependent behaviours such as non-appropriation and disappropriation.  
Towards Technology Appropriation 
As it explores the dichotomy of human nature, a Marxian approach can be used to 
further ratify the divisibility between technology-as-artifact and technology-in-use. 
Through the separation of species being and social being, we can elicit respective 
behaviors and attitudes toward each stage of a technology – first as it is considered 
and secondly as it is appropriated. This is consistent with socio-cultural theories in 
which appropriation is seen as the transformative process an object undergoes, 
whereby changing social practices coincide with the introduction of a technology. 
The changing state of technology-as-artifact into technology-in-use is central to 
appropriation and the Marxian perspective allows us the following explorations: 
• The perception an individual has toward an artifact, which may identify what 
specific designs or features invested in a technology initiate a higher process of 
realization; and 
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• The way a technology shapes and is shaped by cultures or organizations as it is 
placed into use, allowing us to consider the ostensibly social nature of many 
technologies and how they become cultural tools. This provides a new design 
perspective that may predict actions on the part of individuals and groups, and 
suggest social patterns for which a technology is more easily realized.  
In terms of what we can provide the social sciences, the field itself has admitted to 
grappling with the problem of empirical evidence (Conference on the State of the 
Social Sciences, 2004). IS research methods can bring rigor and relevance to a 
Marxian approach while retaining its rich sociological foundations. The human-
technology nexus within information systems is the ideal testing grounds for an 
investigation of such theory, and there are limitless empirical settings with which to 
engage it. Furthermore, by employing a social science underpinning, we can bring 
the IS field:  
• A general understanding and prediction of behaviors and drivers for the 
successful take-up of a new system or device that focuses on the individual 
employee in the context of their subsuming hierarchies. Such insight can assist 
the training, promotion or distribution of a new technology that takes note of the 
anticipated perception, orientation and realization processes of an individual’s 
setting while mitigating the risk of ‘non-‘ or ‘dis-‘ appropriation; and 
• A model that allows designers to understand how individuals within a particular 
social setting might perceive a technology and its subsequent orientation 
process. Technologies can be designed with social patterns in mind and 
marketed to capitalize on these predicted responses.   
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